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A HYPOTHETICAL CASE: VALUE
CAPTURE/JOINT DEVELOPMENT
TECHNIQUES TO REDUCE THE PUBLIC
COSTS OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS
DAVID L. CALLIES*
Although we cannot yet say that value capture will be unfail-
ingly successful in defraying the capital costs of development in
all U.S. cities, it offers a major untapped source of transit reve-
nue . . . . Most of the initiative for the use of value capture
techniques must come from the local level.
Robert M. Patricelli
Former Administrator
Urban Mass Transportation
Administration
It has now been several years since Christopher Duerksen and I
proposed a series of techniques to reduce the public sector costs of
fixed guideway rapid transit systems.' While Mr. Duerksen has gone
on to work more extensively in historic preservation and industrial
siting problems, I have continued to work with the Rice Center for
* Professor of Law, University of Hawaii School of Law; A.B., DePauw Univer-
sity, 1965; J.D., University of Michigan, 1968; LL.M., Nottingham University (En-
gland), 1969. Much of the research which forms the basis for this article was
completed under the auspices of the United States Urban Mass Transportation Ad-
ministration's Division of Research and Training.
1. Callies & Duerksen, Value Capture As a Source of Funds to Finance Public
Projects, 8 URBAN L. ANN. 73 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Callies & Duerksen].
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Community Design and Research in Houston' to develop techniques
for various cities (including Atlanta, Honolulu, Miami, Pittsburgh
and Portland, Oregon) whose officials expressed interest in value cap-
ture techniques. By taking appropriate legislative or administrative
action, many municipalities have either begun to incorporate these
techniques into their legislative or constitutional frameworks, 3 or
have employed them in practical decisionmaking as fixed guideway
projects progress.
The past four years' field work and legal research have created a
picture of the process that a municipality might usefully undertake if
it wishes to proceed with a fixed guideway transit system-or, indeed,
any public improvement with a fixed site that involves substantial
costs to the public and special benefits to nearby property owners.4
As noted in the earlier article,5 any value thus conferred upon such
neighboring property owners is arguably "unearned" since it results
not from any effort by the owners, but rather is due to substantial
expenditures (usually accompanied by heavy public debt) by a gov-
ernmental entity customarily using general tax revenues. If the
"unearned increment" can be thus "captured," the result should be a
corresponding reduction in public costs. The current "taxpayers' re-
volt" over the high cost of government services makes such tech-
niques worth pursuing.6
The hypothetical below basically follows the same detailed discus-
sion of value capture/joint development theories of previous arti-
cles.7 In brief, they include:
1. Development ofAir Rights
A major opportunity for a public entity to share in the private ben-
efits of an improvement (such as a fixed guideway transit system) is
2. See C. SHARPE, R. EURY & D. CALLIES, VALUE CAPTURE AND JOINT DEVEL-
OPMENT APPLICATIONS (1977).
3. For example, Honolulu is presently considering a package of amendments for
value capture/joint development at the Hawaii decennial constitutional convention in
1978.
4. See, e.g., HAGMAN & MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE
CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (1978) [hereinafter cited as WINDFALLS].
5. Callies & Duerksen, supra note 1, at 74.
6. The recent overwhelming passage of California's Proposition 13, reducing and
putting a lid on property taxes as a source of government "income" is, of course, the
most notorious example.
7. See note 20 infra.
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through the private development of air or other property rights val-
idly acquired by the entity but not needed for current operations.
There are many examples of courts upholding public participation in
private development of publicly acquired air space, notwithstanding
constitutional "public purpose" limitations.8
2. Excess Condemnation
Where the purpose of acquisition is not solely to recoup the cost of
a public venture, the acquisition of more land than necessary for the
direct purposes of an authority's need is likely to be a valid exercise
of eminent domain power, provided there is adequate statutory au-
thority and a good plan sufficiently indicating the ultimate use of
such land.9 The term "excess condemnation" is a poor one since, as
Nichols points out, it infers that more land is being taken than can be
justified for the public use."0 If this were really the case, such a tak-
ing would be unconstitutional.
Four theories have been used to justify so-called excess condemna-
tions:
a. Essential to Operation of Facility
Supplemental condemnation has been successful upon a showing
that the purposes for which the land is acquired are reasonably essen-
tial to a successful operation of the facility."1 "Reasonably essential"
uses, which are not usually directly necessary for transit development,
may include parking lots, stores, restaurants, hotels or other commer-
cial facilities, or buffer landscaping that may help maintain property
values in adjacent areas.
b. Future Use and Disposition
A number of cases recognize the validity of supplemental condem-
nation for future expansion. 2 This approach allows the condemning
authority to temporarily utilize the land to produce income, or even
8. See notes 27-41 and accompanying text infra.
9. Callies, Williams & Sharpe, Value Capture Policy, 42 PLANNING 22 (October,
1976); 2A P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, § 7.516 [1] (3d rev. ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as NICHOLS].
10. NICHOLS, supra note 9, at § 7.5122, n.1.
11. See notes 60-70 and accompanying text infra. See also Callies & Duerksen,
supra note 1, at 77-80.
12. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text infra.
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sell the land outright should it later prove to be surplus. As in other
supplemental condemnation cases, a court must rely on constitutional
provisions and statutes that describe in detail the powers and duties
of the public body involved.
c. The Protective Theory
A third theory that justifies supplemental condemnation is known
as the protective theory. For example, city-owned land adjacent to
transit stops could be sold under restrictions intended to preserve the
amenity, or at least reduce the usual amount of blight caused by the
transit system, and thus facilitate an increase in value of surrounding
properties. 13
d. Remnant Theory
Taking only the minimum land directly needed for the public pro-
ject may leave many fragments of lots, the shape of which may
render them separately valueless. A city or other condemning au-
thority can be required to pay for the whole although it took only a
part. 14
The basic advantage of such acquisitions from a joint develop-
ment/value capture perspective is that the additional property rights
acquired can either be parceled together and sold for private develop-
ment, used to enhance the attractiveness (and value) of surrounding
areas, or used as noted above in the air rights discussion.
3. Monetary Transfers
Several cities are examining special benefit assessment and tax in-
crement financing schemes for use as value capture techniques. As
noted below, California has a special benefits assessment statute ap-
plicable to transit stops, 5 and the state of Florida has joined several
other states in passing tax increment financing laws, this time for
value capture/joint development purposes.' 6
a. Special Benet Assessment
Assuming that evidence can be marshalled to show that transit
13. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text infra.
14. See Luby v. City of Dallas, 396 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
15. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 99000-99026 (Deering 1970).
16. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.387 (West Supp. 1979).
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lines or stops do indeed confer special benefits, legislation could per-
mit governmental agencies to establish special assessment districts
encompassing either the transit line as a whole or just the immediate
vicinity around transit stops. The owners of such land would be as-
sessed a certain percentage of the system's cost, with individual obli-
gations based on criteria such as lot size and distance from the transit
station. Most state courts have been reluctant to interfere with legis-
lative decisions that define the boundaries of analogous special bene-
fit districts.' 
7
b. Tax Increment Financing
Basically, tax increment financing is a method by which one mu-
nicipal agency or corporation pledges all or a portion of the incre-
mental tax revenue generated by a public improvement to pay for the
cost of a project that has been created and initially paid for by a
second agency. The amount pledged is generally derived from the ad
valorem property taxes within the improvement district, and the in-
cremental value thus accrued and reflected in the ad valorem prop-
erty tax pays off the bonds issued by the developing agency. This
device is particularly popular among local and federally-funded de-
velopment agencies that must undertake major redevelopment
projects." One of the major advantages of such a system or tech-
nique is that no new taxes are levied or collected. Rather, the burden
is spread over an extended period of time and falls upon whichever
general purpose government is pledging the increments (or a portion
thereof) created by the redevelopment.
This concludes a broad outline of the general value capture theory.
What follows is a hypothetical analysis of the decisionmaking process
from the perspective of the lead public entity and its principal legal
advisor.
A HYPOTHETICAL CASE: THE METROPOLIS RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM
Metropolis, a city of 1,500,000, received a tentative commitment
from the Urban Mass Transportation Authority (UMTA) for
$500,000,000 to fund eighty per cent of a fifteen-mile fixed-guideway
rapid transit system. The system will connect the central city area
17. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 99101 (Deering 1970).
18. See, RALPH ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, REDEVELOPMENT AND TAX IN-
CREMENT FINANCING BY CITIES AND COUNTIES IN CALIFORNIA (1976).
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with high density communities both within and without the city lim-
its,19 ultimately ending at the local airport terminal. The alignment
looks something like this:
- ~0 Airport /%
9 Vacant Industrial
Regional Commercial
eUrban Core
Downtown
City Limits
ZUrban Core
'5. .....fl
* Suburban Commercial
* Suburban Residential
The mayor and council, together with certain affected suburban
19. Pursuant to § 5(e) of the Federal Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as
amended, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1614 (1976).
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areas and the state, set about devising a method of raising the
$120,000,000 local share of the proposed costs. One of the sources
they hope to tap is that part of the private sector which will substan-
tially benefit from the location of the transit system. However, before
fixing the alignment of the system and finally placing the stops
thereon, the city first must determine what alternatives it has to reach
the private sector. Accordingly, the city attorney's office has been
asked by the mayor and council to prepare a list of alternatives for
value capture/joint development for the city's review.2"
A. Governmental Entity/Choice of Agency
First the city attorney examined the power and authority of the
potential transit operating and constructing bodies-state, county,
city and special agencies21'-and opted for using the city transporta-
tion department. Other things being equal, a general-purpose gov-
ernment (state, city, county) has more authority than a special-
purpose agency, which is strictly limited by the scope of its legisla-
tively-defined duties.22 While the alignment passes through the
20. For treatment of this subject generally see D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING
AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW, §§ 176-77 (1971); WINDFALLS, supra note
4; SELECTED STUDIES IN HIGHWAY LAW (J. Vance ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Vance]; Callies & Duerksen, Value Recapture. A Rose by Another Name, 26 ZONING
DIG. 5 (1974); Callies & Duerksen, supra note 1; Callies & Siemon, The Value Capture
1H;pothesis.'A SecondAnalysis, 8 TRANSP. L.J. 9 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Callies &
Siemon]; Callies, Williams & Sharpe, Value Capture Policy, 42 PLANNING 22 (Octo-
ber 1976); R. Batchelder, Value Capture Policy: Prospects for Financing Public In-
vestment in Mass Transportation (Spring 1976) (thesis for Indiana University
Graduate School of Business Administration T-590 [hereinafter cited as Batchelder];
Rice Center for Community Design & Research, A Value Capture Policy: Legal Ele-
ment (November 1974) (study prepared for U.S. Dept. of Transp. DOT-TST-75-83
(1) [hereinafter cited as Legal Element]; Rice Center for Community Design & Re-
search, Value Capture and Joint Development Applications: Chicago, Louisville, Los
Angeles (January 1977) (study prepared for U.S. Dept. of Transp. DOT-TST-77-72)
[hereinafter cited as Joint Development Applications].
21. For an excellent recent review of the powers and duties of various governmen-
tal entities and their relationship to the federal systems see D. MANDELKER & D.
NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM, CASES AND
MATERIALS (1977). For an example of a foreign institutional framework which seems
to work well, see the discussion of Toronto, Montreal, and Ottawa in E. HOLMES,
COORDINATION OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES, 113-27, (1974) (U.S. GPO Stock #5001-00076)
[hereinafter cited as HOLMES].
22. See generally 2 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 4.03.14 (3d ed.
1966) [hereinafter cited as MCQUILLAN].
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county and some separately-incorporated municipalities, most of the
proposed line will lie within the territorial jurisdiction of the city.
The city is an independent home rule city which, through its charter,
is protected by the state constitution from legislative incursion across
a range of areas including public transportation.23 The city has the
power to carry out a host of functions (including a general power of
eminent domain) and the ability to amend its charter to provide fur-
ther authority for joint development/value capture, if necessary.
Moreover, the state constitution's local government article has an in-
tergovernmental relations clause 24 specifically authorizing the kind of
intergovernmental cooperation between the city and its outlying ar-
eas which the city attorney believes is necessary for the project's suc-
cess. This full array of potentially vital powers is not available to a
separate transit agency, which is a limited-authority creature of the
state legislature. State level origin leads to more state domination
and less freedom of action than the city desires.
A separate transit agency does have at least three potential advan-
tages: first, the state can grant authority over construction and opera-
tion of a system, including the power to condemn, in any
governmental jurisdiction through which a proposed alignment
passes; second, the state can specifically tailor the agency to mass
transit needs, with an appropriate array of powers such as eminent
domain, taxation and intergovernmental contracting; finally, a sepa-
rate agency presumably has a separate source of funds (e.g., bonding
power, or specific line items in state budget appropriations.) The
funding weapon, however, can be a two-edged sword: the city has an
established rating in the municipal bonds market and its issues, rated
triple-A, get a most favorable borrowing rate. The bonds of a new
agency, unless clearly backed by the state's full faith and credit,
would be less marketable, and in any event the state has only a sim-
ple A rating."
Of course, if the city were not a home rule municipality, the city
attorney's opinion might differ. The county may be a useful transit
developer, since it is a strong and relatively independent unit of gov-
ernment in this particular state. Its mass transit authority, however,
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., HAWAII CONST. § 6; ILL. CONST. art. 6.
25. Examples: Metropolitan Atlanta Regional Transportation Authority
(MARTA) in Atlanta; Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) in San Francisco.
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is largely implied from a general state transportation statute,26 which
would probably need to be amended by the state legislature.
B. Public Purpose and Air Rights
Among the potentials which the city has in mind is the joint devel-
opment of several tracts at or adjoining some of the proposed transit
stations. For example, it has already received tentative inquiries
from several hotel chains concerning the location of a major hotel, on
the surface, subsurface, and air rights, above one of the principal
downtown stations (the transit system will likely be below grade at
that point).2 The group is using the Bonaventure development in
downtown Montreal as its guide, with its complex of underground
shops adjoining the station and hotel-office space above.28 Further
26. See. e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 51-1 (1968).
27. See RIVKIN & ASSOCIATES, INC., ACQUISITION OF LAND FOR JOINT DEVEL-
OPMENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, MAIN REPORT 550-55 (1976) U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, NITS PB 273-398) [hereinafter cited as MAIN REPORT]; R. WRIGHT,
THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 259-64 (1968); Barton-Aschman Associates, Multiple Use of
Lands *Yithin Highwa, Rights of Wa'a, in NATIONAL COOPERATIVE HIGHWAY RE-
SEARCH PROGRAM REPORT No. 53, 55-56 (1968); Callies & Duerksen, supra note 20,
at 92; Callies & Siemon, supra note 20, at 25; Legal Element, supra note 20, at 55-60;
Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, Valuation ofAir Space, in SELECTED STUDIES
IN HIGHWAY LAW, at ch. V (J. Vance ed. 1976); Diris, Use ofAir Rights Over Urban
Expressways, TRANS. ENG. J. 357 (May, 1966); Hodgman, Air Rights and Public Fi-
nance.- Public Use in a New Guise, 42 So. CAL. L. REV. 625 (1969); Joint Development
Applications, supra note 20, at 50, 104 & 160; Wright, Airspace Utilization on Highway
Rights of Win 55 IOWA L. REV. 761 (1970).
28. HOLMES, supra note 3, at 123-27; J. Dakin, Toronto Planning: A Planning
Review of the Legal and Jurisdictional Contexts, from 1912 to 1970 (1974) (Dep't of
Urban and Regional Planning, Planning and Design Paper No. 3, Univ. of Toronto),
D. Dewees, Some Effects of Conversion from Streetcar to Subway Transit Lines in
Toronto (1976) (Centre for Urban and Community Studies, Research Paper No. 76,
Univ. of Toronto); U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, LAND USE IMPACTS OF RAPID
TRANSIT, 34-54 (1977).
Apparently the Southern California Rapid Transit District has been advised it can
deal in air rights, even participating in the development itself so long as some relation
to the transit customer's convenience is maintained:
Section 30631 authorizes the District to acquire or construct all facilities neces-
sary or convenient for rapid transit service together with such structures neces-
sary or convenient for access of persons thereto.
In our opinion these broad powers would include the development of commer-
cially oriented facilities designed for customer convenience as well as additional
revenues.
In and about bus stations or fixed guideway stations the potential uses for sur-
plus land and air rights would involve such commercial development as service
stations and allied development, retail commercial uses and commercial parking.
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out, near the airport, a major commercial developer, in conjunction
with a motel chain, has made a similar proposal with respect to air
rights where a station will be at grade level.
These proposals present the city attorney with several problems.
First, there is the question of acquiring the sites. Although the ex-
isting city charter contains the power to construct and run any gen-
eral transportation system,29 and declares that any land acquired in
furtherance thereof is for a "public purpose,"3 the antiquated mass
Insofar as locating interested businesses is concerned, prospective users of
property available for sale or lease are normally sought through publicity and
advertising or through the use of brokers.
In conclusion, the District possesses the legal authority to use its stations, adja-
cent land and system air rights for commercial development. In order to evalu-
ate fully the most desirable method of proceeding in such a venture, (i.e., sale,
short/long term lease, etc.) and to assure a good working relationship with local
governments, adequate lead time is essential. To this end, a comprehensive
study of design and marketing considerations would undoubtedly be the first step
toward developing a Board policy on customer services in the District.
R. Downs, Commissions, Lawyers and Air Rights (Dec. 23, 1964) (Memo to Jack R.
Gilstrap, S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. General Manager).
29. See, e.g., Charter for City and County of Honolulu, 1959 Haw. Sess. Laws, act
261 (published at 2 HAW. REv. STAT. app. 1 (1968)).
30. See, e.g., Poole v. City of Kankakee, 406 Ill. 521, 523, 94 N.E.2d 416, 419
(1951) for broad definitions of public use/public purpose:
(1) that it affect a community as distinguished from an individual; (2) that the
law control the use to be made of the property; (3) that the title so taken be not
invested in a person or corporation as a private property to be used and con-
trolled as private property; and (4) that the public reap the benefit of public pos-
session and use, and that no one exercise control except the municipality.
Almost to the same effect is the definition found in Cleveland, Cincinnati. Chi-
cago and St. Louis Railway Co. v. Po/cat Drainage Dist., 213 Ill. 83: "A public use
means public usefulness, utility, advantage or benefit. It is not essential that the
entire community or people of the State, or any political subdivision thereof,
should be benefited or share in the use or enjoyment thereof. The use may be
local or limited. It may be confined to a particular district and still be public.
[Citation] If local or limited, the use must be directly beneficial to a considerable
number of the inhabitants of a section of the State, and the property to be taken
must be controlied by law, for the advantage of that particular portion of the
community to be benefited." Id. at 527, 94 N.E.2d 419-20.
In People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago R.R. Terminal Auth., 14 Ill. 2d 230, 151
N.E.2d 311 (1958), the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a statute authorizing the crea-
tion of rail terminal authorities and granting them broad powers to condemn and
redevelop land in former railway terminal areas. In the process, the court stated:
"Public purpose" is not a static concept. It is flexible, and is capable of expan-
sion to meet conditions of a complex society that were not within the contempla-
tion of the framers of our constitution. [Citation omitted]
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transit code passed pursuant to that charter was for a trolley line in
streets the city already owned and gave the city only the authority to
The primary objects of the statute are the removal of the blighted conditions
caused by antiquated terminal areas, the promotion of the growth and develop-
ment of the city, and the relief of traffic congestion by extending streets through
the areas and by furnishing off-street parking. Contentions that similar statutes
did not serve a public use and a public purpose have been rejected. [Citation
omitted] It may be that private railroad corporations will derive some benefit
under the act. Those benefits, however, will be incidental to the principal purpose of
the statute, as were the collateral benefits in the cited cases. The only portion of
the area in which the railroad companies will have any direct interest will be the
portion occupied by the new consolidated station and its approaches. The Au-
thority will own and operate the facilities; the railroad companies will be its les-
sees. These circumstances neither neutralize nor destroy the public purpose and
public use that the GeneralAssembl hasfoundto exist. (Emphasis added.) Id. at
235-36, 151 N.E.2d 314-315.
Recently the Illinois courts also upheld the Industrial Building Revenue Bond Act,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-74-I to 11-74-13 (Smith-Hurd 1971), which permits
municipal corporations to acquire and construct industrial facilities and to lease the
same to private parties. People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 53 Ill. 2d 347, 291
N.E,2d 807 (1972). Once again, the court set out in some detail a broad and liberal
definition of public purpose:
It is urged that the Act, in establishing a scheme for leasing and ultimately
conveying the property to a private tenant, is not an enactment for public pur-
poses and thus contravenes section l(a) of article VIII of the 1970 constitution,
which provides: "Public funds, property or credit shall be used only for public
purposes." We assume without deciding, that public funds or property in some
manner may be involved, and that the "public purpose" test must be met.
We have held on a number of occasions that if the principal purpose and ob-
jective in a given enactment is public in nature, it does not matter that there will
be an incidental benefit to private interests. [Citations omitted] While we ac-
knowledge that there is a benefit to private interests in the financing of industrial
projects under the Act, we hold that the princ palpurpose and objective of the Act is
public in nature. Therefore, it does not matter that there will be an incidental benefit
to private interests.
In Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority (1948), 399 Ill. 579, at 588, we recog-
nized that what is for the public good and what are public purposes are, in the
first instance, questions for the General Assembly to determine; that the legisla-
ture is vested with a large discretion; that its determinations are entitled to full
consideration; and that courts are not warranted in setting aside such an enact-
ment unless it is clearly evasive of or contrary to constitutional prohibitions. We
find no clear evasion of a constitutional prohibition relative to the Act meeting
the public purposes standard. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 354-55, 291 N.E.2d at
813.
See also Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 191,
339 A.2d 278, 289 (1975) ("Under our cases, projects reasonably designed to benefit
the public by significantly enhancing the economic growth of the State, or its subdivi-
sions, are public uses, at least when the exercise of the power of condemnation pro-
vides an impetus which private enterprise cannot provide"). Accord, Tanner v.
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operate a mass transit system.31 Therefore, the transportation code
must be amended to provide the power to construct the system as
well as run it.32
Second, there is the question of the degree of property interest to
be condemned. At one downtown site the land is already owned in
fee simple by the city (it is-or was-a municipal parking lot), so
there is no question about title to surface, air and subsurface rights
there. However, for the other sites the city attorney is concerned with
the degree of taking which he can justify where the sole purpose of
the condemnation is for a transit station. He anticipates that private
owners will maintain that the city is entitled to take only what it
needs-a subsurface interest downtown and a surface interest in the
at-grade locations-leaving the valuable air, surface and subsurface
rights not needed for stations and rights-of-way in the hands of the
condemnees.3 3 It is not clear from the charter that the city must take
in fee simple, which would help resolve the question.34 The state
courts have never heard a case challenging the right of the city to take
Treasury Tunnel Mining & Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83 P. 464 (1906). See Cal-
lies & Siemon, supra note 20, at 13-15.
3 1. See, e.g., D. CALLIES, S. LICHTENFELD, S. DIXON, R. EURY & R. HARMON,
PRELIMINARY VALUE CAPTURE ANALYSIS FOR PROPOSED FIXED-GUIDEWAY RAPID
TRANSIT SYSTEM, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU 19 (1978) (Report prepared for
the City and County of Honolulu Department of Transportation Services).
32. Id. at 19-20.
33. For cases which so hold, see Louisiana v. Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co.,
350 So.2d 847 (La. 1977); Krauter v. Lower Big Blue Natural Resources Dist., 199
Neb. 431, 259 N.W.2d 472 (1977); Commonwealth v. Renick, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 30,
342 A.2d 824 (1975). In Renick, the court stated:
Further, a construction of the words "title to lands" as meaning "estate in fee
simple absolute" and hence requiring the Commission to take a greater interest
than it needs, flies in the face of the principle that, inasmuch as property cannot
constitutionally be taken by eminent domain except for public use, no more
property may be taken than the public use requires-a rule which applies both to
the amount of property and the state or interest to be acquired. Unless the stat-
ute expressly provides that a fee simple absolute estate must be taken which, as
we have pointed out the instant statute does not, only an easement will be ac-
quired by the condemnor, if that is all it requires. 3 Nichols, The Law of Emi-
nent Domain, §§ 9.-2[1][2][3] (3d rev. ed. 1974); Truitt v. Borough of Ambridge
Water Authority, 389 Pa. 429, 133 A.2d 797 (1957).
Id. at 798, 342 A.2d 827.
34. For example, the courts in Pennsylvania have generally held that an agency
can condemn only an interest in real property which is necessary for the intended
public use, in the absence of express statutory language requiring the interest taken be
in fee simple. Lazarus v. Morris, 212 Pa. 128, 61 A. 815 (1905).
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in fee simple for all projects involving construction, which has been
the city's policy in the past. Hopefully, counsel advises the city, he
can justify the acquisition of air rights on the ground that technologi-
cal requirements, potential severance damages, maintenance require-
ments, and the need to extinguish abutting owners' rights make such
acquisition necessary.35
Assuming the city is able to obtain fee simple interest to all of the
station land, there is some question of how it can use excess interests
in land validly acquired.36 If it opts to dispose of excess air, surface,
35. Allegheny County, which will construct a light rail transit system in Pitts-
burgh, has been so advised by its counsel. Robert M. Brown & David E. Johnson,
Memorandum to Alleghency County (October 8, 1970).
36. Cousins & Heightchew, Land Use and Transportation ch. IV, in HIGHWAY
USERS FOUNDATION TECH. STUDY MEMO. No. 11 (1975); ATLANTA REGION COM-
MISSION, PUBLIC/PRIVATE JOINT DEVELOPMENT AND RECOMMENDED MODELS FOR
PUBLIC/PRIVATE JOINT VENTURES FOR RAPID TRANSIT STATION AREA DEVELOP-
MENT 33 (1974). But see ATLANTA REGIONAL COUNCIL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR
RIGHTS AND EXCESS PROPERTY, (1978), for how such property can be used. See also
Callies & Siemon, supra note 20, at 24; Callies & Duerksen, supra note 20, at 92; Legal
Element, supra note 20, at 55. Illinois has considered the question in People ex rel.
Adamowski v. Chicago R.R. Terminal Auth., 14 Ill. 2d 230, 151 N.E.2d 385 (1958):
[Tihe Authority is authorized to acquire by gift, purchase or eminent domain
the property located within the boundaries of such area. [Citations omitted]
Upon acquisition the Authority is authorized to remove the existing terminals,
terminal facilities, freight facilities and other buildings and structures located
within the area and install and construct streets, utilities and site improvements;
construct and operate a new consolidated railroad terminal, terminal facilities
and approaches thereto; enter into leases and contracts with railroad companies
for use by said railroad companies of such terminal and terminal facilities; enter
into contracts and leasesfor the operation of restaurants, stores or other enterprises
commonl found in a terminal station; make provision for off-street parking; con-
vet real property in the area not requiredfor the construction and operation of the
new terminal approaches thereto to public bodiesfor streets, alleys, schools, parks
and pla 'grounds andfor other public purposes and to convey an, land not needed
for theforegoingpurposes to private individuals and corporationsfor redevelopment
by private enterprise in accordance with a redevelopment plan to be approved by
the Authority and the city council of the city.
Id. at 234-35, 151 N.E.2d at 314 (Emphasis added). The enabling legislation for the
Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) expressly contemplates disposition of "excess"
property by either sale or lease:
Section I1. Lease, Sale or Other Disposition of Property.
The Grantee may lease, sell or otherwise dispose of any property in its prop-
erty accounts which is no longer necessary, appropriate, or adapted to the proper
operation and maintenance of the Transit System. Any property so sold or dis-
posed of shall be removed from the property accounts of the Grantee.
The net rental or net income arising from the leasing of any property in the
property accounts of the Grantee shall constitute and be part of the gross reve-
nues of the Grantee but only so long as such property is used or useful as operat-
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or subsurface interests outright, there is a good argument for doing so
ing transportation property. Chicago, Ill., Metropolitan Transit Authority Act
(April 23, 1945).
According to CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, REAL ESTATE PRACTICES AND PROCE-
DURES, CLAIMS LAW/REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT (1975), a manual on real estate
practices and procedures, disposition of "surplus" property is handled by the Real
Estate Department. That department analyzes the CTA's holdings from time to time
to determine where real property rights are not necessary for present or future needs.
The manual lists several examples, including air spaces over transit lines and station
facilities, surface spaces over and alongside subsurface transit facilities, surface spaces
beneath transit facilities such as aerial structures, excess land lying outside of CTA
right-of-way, and surface space required for future transit development such as the
expansion of parking facilities at station areas. Id. at 29.
When it is decided to sell property rights (as opposed to lease), the CTA engages in
limited value capture: "Sale or long-term grants of excess property rights within de-
veloping economic zones shall be deferred until substantial value appreciation has ac-
crued as a result of this development.. .. Generally, CT4participation will be through
its land ownership, with the aim of achieving optimum return, while retaining maximum
control" Id. at 31. (Emphasis added). Indeed, there is considerable evidence of such
private uses on transit district property in Chicago. Having acquired much of the
system from a multitude of private rail companies in the 1940's, the CTA also ac-
quired a number of leaseholds for purposes such as newspaper and food vending.
Although many of those tenancies were year-to-year in nature, many have been con-
tinued, generally in the area of transit stops. Interview with Thomas Kennedy & Sal
Bianchi, attorneys for the CTA, in Chicago, Ill. (February 1974). Most of the news
and food vendors clearly serve the convenience of the transit system's patrons as well
as provide additional revenue for the system.
See also ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121, §§ 314a26-314a54 (1978), which permits the Illi-
nois Tollway Commission:
To contract with and grant concessions to or to lease to any person, partner-
ship, firm, association or corporation so desiring the use of any part of any toll
highways, excluding the paved portion thereof, but including the right of way
adjoining, under, or over said paved portion for the placing of telephone, tele-
graph, electric, power lines and other utilities, and for the placing of pipe lines,
and to contract with and grant concessions to or to lease to any person, partner-
ship, firm, association or corporation so desiring the use of any part of the toll
highways, excluding the paved portion thereof, but including the right of way
adjoining, or over said paved portion for motor fuel service stations andfacilities,
garages, stores, hotels and restaurants, or for any other lawful purpose, except for
the tracks for railroad, railway or street railway use, and to fix the terms, condi-
tions, rents, rates and charges for such use.
Id. at § 314a34. (Emphasis added). Acting pursuant to such authority, the Tollway
Commission has leased space to a number of commercial restaurant and gasoline
service station establishments both adjoining and over tollways in Illinois.
The Illinois Municipal Code specifically grants every municipality power to deal in
air space by means of long-term leases:
Every municipality has the power to lease the space above and around build-
ings located on land owned or otherwise held by the municipality to any person
for any term not exceeding 99 years.
Every municipality has the power to lease, in the same manner and for a simi-
[Vol. 16.155
VALUE CAPTURE/JOINT DEVELOPMENT
under the constraints set out in its charter.37 Those constraints were
drafted to provide for the orderly disposition of used equipment.
lar term, any space over any street, alley, or other public place, in the municipal-
ity, more than 12 feet above the level of the street, alley, or other public place, to
the person who owns the fee or a leasehold estate, for a term not less than that of
the proposed lease, in the property on both sides of the portion of the street,
alley, or other public place so to be leased, whenever the corporate authorities of
the municipality are of the opinion that that space is not needed for street, alley,
or other public purpose, and that the public interest will be subserved by such
leasings. The leasing of such a space shall be authorized by ordinance. In this
ordinance the lease and its terms shall be set forth with reasonable certainty.
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 24, § 11-75-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962). For sheer power to undertake
such development, nothing can beat CALTRANS and its authority to utilize so-called
-'surface" rights over and beneath highways in its right-of-way. The statutory author-
ity, though never tested in court, is very broad:
The department may lease to public agencies or private entities for any term
not to exceed 99 years the use of areas above or below state highways, subject to
-uch reservations, restrictions and conditions as it deems necessary to assure ade-
quate protection to the safety and the adequacy of highway facilities and to abut-
ting or adjacent land uses . . . . Prior to entering into any such lease, the
department shall determine that the proposed use is not in conflict with the zon-
ing regulations of the local government concerned. Such leases shall be made in
accordance with procedures to be prescribed by the California Highway Com-
mission, except that in the case of leases with private entities such leases shall
only be made after competitive bidding unless the commission finds by unani-
mous vote that in certain cases competitive bidding would not be in the best
interests of the state. The possibilities of entering into such leases and the conse-
quent benefits to be derived therefrom may be considered by the department in
designing and constructing such highways. Revenue from such leases shall be
deposited in the State Highway Fund.
CAL. STS. & HY. CODE § 104.12 (Deering 1978). On the strength of its statutory au-
thority, CALTRANS has issued a series of implementing regulations:
10.001 Mission
The Mission of the Airspace Development unit is to implement a positive pro-
gram of airspace development and nonoperating right of way. Such a program
must be sensitive to local community needs and should insure the achievement of
the following major goals:
1. To integrate highways into the community in a manner which is compati-
ble with local planning goals and objectives through multiple use of high-
way fights of way.
2. To increase the local tax base through development of airspace to its high-
est and best use.
3. To reduce the amount of private property utilized for highway support
facilities and other public uses.
4. To enhance and protect the transportation corridor and its environs.
5. To increase the return on the taxpayers' investment through rental reve-
nue.
10.002 Airspace Defined
Airspace is any property within the highway right of way limits which is capa-
ble of other uses without undue interference with the operation and possible fu-
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Nonetheless, there is no exclusion for real property interests, and the
ture expansion of the transportation corridor for highway or other transportation
uses.
It may consist of surface rights under a viaduct structure, the space above the
traveled lanes, space within a loop of an interchange, or space between the main
lanes and on or off ramps, of area in cut of fill slopes.
Airspace may also include excess parcels when the combination of excess land
and airspace will result in substantially better land utilization than could be at-
tained if developed separately.
10.003 Responsibilities of the Airspace Development Section
1. Development of a positive program for maximum utilization of highway
airspace consistent with the planning objectives and goals of the local com-
munities.
2. Administration of all freeway lease areas and airspace.
3. Identification of potential airspace sites and maintenance of the Airspace
Site Inventory.
4. Implementation of the Marler-Johnson Highway Park Act, Section 14012 of
the Government Code.
5. Implementation of Section 104.15 of the Streets and Highways Code deal-
ing with the use of excess land for park and recreational purposes.
6. Liaison with the Community and Environmental Factors Unit in identify-
ing the multiple-use concepts developed in the planning and design process.
7. Implementation of Multiple-use concepts developed in the planning and
design process.
8. Coordination with the District Maintenance and Landscape Departments in
locating highway maintenance facilities on airspace.
9. Cooperation with State, federal and local agencies in location of govern-
mental facilities on highway airspace.
10. Cooperation with private industry in development of improvements on sites
suitable for such use.
10.004 The Use of Airspace for Building Improvements
It is the responsibility of the Airspace Development Unit to encourage the con-
struction of building improvements on highway airspace when it has been deter-
mined that:
1. construction of improvements will not conflict with necessary future ex-
pansion of the highway facility for highway or other transportation modes,
2. the proposed use will tend to integrate the freeway into the community
and is acceptable to the local community as being consistent with local
planning or zoning ordinances,
3. the proposed use will result in an increase in the local tax base, or result in
other substantial community benejits,
4. the proposed use is economically sound and afair market rent can be ob-
tained,
5. the proposed use is aesthetically and functionally compatible with the
highway corridor and its environs.
CALTRANS, RIGHT OF WAY MANUAL, ch. 10 (April 20, 1962) (Emphasis added).
Acting under this broad authority, CALTRANS has leased space under the Santa
Monica Freeway for a 248-unit warehouse and at Culver City for commercial shop-
ping center parking. Interview with W.H.L. Parrish and Darrell Haynes in Sacra-
mento, Cal. (August 28, 1975). There are plans in Los Angeles to lease space under
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complex and time-consuming notice and public bidding require-
ments will make negotiations with private interests for a unified sta-
tion development package difficult.38 Indeed, if the city decides to
retain ownership and "dispose" of leasehold interests, it must proceed
under a theory that supports a "partnering" with the private sector;
such theories may include the duty to make the most of excess city
property 39 or the duty to leave actual development-and the advan-
tages a private developer may obtain by working with a governmen-
tal "partner"-to the private sector as being wholly beyond the
purview of a government.40 Of course, one of the downtown stops
may be located within a redevelopment district, which would proba-
other freeways for industrial buildings and auto dealerships, using the underside of
the freeway for roofing. In Sacramento, the Sacramento Transit District leases space
under the freeway to store its buses, and under U.S. 80 there is a commercial parking
lot for recreational vehicles. Over the Capitol Street Bridge in Sacramento there are
plans for a restaurant over the Sacramento River. Such programs produce between
$6 and $8 million per year for CALTRANS. Id.
37. Pennsylvania imposes specific restraints on acquisition and disposition of ex-
cess property. See Starky v. Philadelphia, 397 Pa. 512, 156 A.2d 101 (1959); Dickel v.
Bucks-Falls Elec. Co., 306 Pa. 504, 160 A. 115 (1932); Lazarus v. Morris, 212 Pa. 128,
61 A. 815 (1905); E. SNITZER, PENNSYLVANIA EMINENT DOMAIN 123 (1965). Florida
statutes formerly empowered a municipality to sell or lease property, including air
rights, no longer needed for a public use. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 167.77 (West 1966)
(repealed 1973). Many states still so provide: Pennsylvania, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 345(a) (Purdon 1974) (parking authorities), upheld in Price v. Philadelphia Parking
Auth., 422 Pa. 317, 221 A.2d 138 (1966):
In order to assist in defraying its expenses, the Authority is also empowered by
the enabling act "to lease portions of the street level or lower floors of... park-
ing . . . [facilities] for commercial use .. " Ibid. However, leases of such
commercial space within Authority facilities are subject to the explicit statutory
requirement that they be entered into "on a fair competitive basis." Ibid. Thus,
the enabling act distinguishes between the leasing of facilities for operations as
an Authority parking garage and the leasing of commercial space for incidental,
revenue producing purposes, explicitly mandating that the latter commercial
leases be granted only on the basis of competitive bidding. Ibid. It is clear, there-
fore, that the power to lease air-rights is an aspect of the Authority's power to
lease non-parking commercial space and only incidental to its primary purpose
of providing parking facilities for the general public.
Id. at 146.
38. See Legal Element. supra note 20, at 55.
39. Several jurisdictions apparently favor this approach, and sometimes statutes
clarify such a purpose. See. e.g., Sunny Isles Fishing Pier Inc. v. Dade County, 79 So.
2d 667 (Fla. 1955), Gate City Garage Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So. 2d 653 (Fla.
1953).
40. See, e.g., Tippins v. Cobb County Parking Auth. 213 Ga. 685, 100 S.E.2d 893
(1957).
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bly permit virtually any mix of private-public venturing, given the
breadth of the operable statutes and the federal and state case law
permitting wholesale condemnation, leasing, selling, and partnering
with the private sector in order to stamp out blight.4 '
C. Public Purpose and Excess Condemnation
The city has also expressed an interest in acquiring real property in
fee at the perimeter of its proposed at-grade stations so that it can
jointly develop additional land made developable by proximity to a
proposed stop. The city attorney has isolated a number of theories
under which he might proceed to acquire this so-called "excess"
land:
42
41. See, e.g., Rubinoffv. District Court, 145 Colo. 225, 360 P.2d 114 (1961) City
of Jacksonville v. Griffin, 346 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1977); Bailey v. Hous. Auth., 214 Ga.
790, 107 S.E.2d 812 (1959); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Schnack, 39 Haw. 543 (1952);
Miller v. City of Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1959); Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97,
103 S.W.2d 651 (1937); Faranda Appeal, 420 Pa. 295, 216 A.2d 769 (1966); Schenck v.
Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31, 70 A.2d 612 (1950); Belovsky v. Redev. Auth., 357 Pa. 329, 54
A.2d 277 (1947); D. MANDELKER, HOUSING SUBSIDIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND
ENGLAND 81-118 (1973). For a brief summary of cases, see Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 297
(1966).
42. For a summary of the changing concept of public use and public purpose, see
Vance, supra note 20, at 767-70; Callies & Duerksen, supra note 1, at 74; Callies &
Siemon, supra note 20, at 1 1-12; Legal Element, supra note 20, at 1-4. The old view is
represented by Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 88 A.
904 (1913); the new view by City of Jacksonville v. Griffin, 346 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1977);
Basehore v. Hampton Indus. Dev. Auth., 433 Pa. 40, 248 A.2d 212 (1968) and Wash-
ington Park, Inc. Appeal, 425 Pa. 349, 229 A.2d 1 (1967). See Dorman v. Philadel-
phia Hous. Auth., 331 Pa. 209, 200 A. 835 (1938), where the court said:
[V]iews as to what constitutes a public use necessarily vary with changing con-
ceptions of the scope and functions of government, so that to-day [sic] there are
familiar examples of such use which formerly would not have been so consid-
ered. As governmental activities increase with the growing complexity and inte-
gration of society, the concept of "public use" naturally expands in proportion.
248 A.2d at 217.
Id. at 221, 200 A. at 840. A recent California decision found that "'necessity' does
not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would
combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to
the condemning party and property owner consistent with such benefit." Monterey
County Flood Control & Water Conserv. Dist. v. Hughes, 201 Cal. App. 2d 197, 213,
20 Cal. Rptr. 252, 262 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). See also County of Los Angeles v. Law
Bldg. Corp., 254 Cal. App. 2d 848, 62 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (holding
questions of necessity for taking property lie exclusively within the purview of the
condemning body, and are not subject to judicial review absent fraud, bad faith, or
abuse of discretion in the sense that the condemnor does not actually intend to use the
property as it formally had resolved).
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1. Ancillary Structures/Services. As the city is the condemnor,
there are a variety of uses-whether or not transit related-for which
the city could condemn, and if such condemnation were in fee sim-
ple, the analysis would be much the same as under the previous sec-
tion.4 3 Thus, for example, the city could decide to place a parking lot
adjoining the station, either for transit purposes or to effectuate the
city's general parking policy. Experts generally support parking as
sufficiently ancillary to a transit system so that condemnation is ac-
ceptable for its accomplishment and many transit statutes specifically
so provide.' Of course, if the operative agency were only a special
purpose transit district, then the number of theories upon which it
could acquire adjacent land would be reduced substantially to in-
clude only those acquisitions which relate to "transit purposes," as
defined by an appropriate enabling statute and, ultimately, confirmed
by the courts. Even if so restricted, however, such a special-purpose
agency could probably condemn land for parking and other services
necessary for public transit. If the enabling statute empowered the
special purpose district to condemn land necessary and "convenient,"
then the scope of such acquisitions could be considerably ex-
panded.45 The city attorney has on other occasions suggested to the
city that he would be more comfortable if the ancillary uses could be
Somewhere in between the old and new views are cases like Port of Umatilla v.
Richmond, 212 Or. 596, 321 P.2d 338 (1958).
43. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
44. See Gate City Garage v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1953); Poole
v. City of Kankakee, 406 Ill. 521, 94 N.E.2d 416 (1950) in which the court said:
As we view it, there is involved the safety and well-being of all the residents of a
community so affected. To provide for off-street parking facilities is certainly a
step to meet the public need. We are of the opinion that the Parking Act em-
braces the taking of land for a public use.
Appellees' objections which go to the operation of the act do little to alter that
conclusion. The argument that the use is private because it enables a municipal
corporation to enter into business in direct competitition with individuals who are
now operating parking lots cannot be sustained
406 IlL. at 529, 94 N.E.2d at 420 (Emphasis added).
See also Seligsohn v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 412 Pa. 372, 194 A.2d 606 (1963).
45. The difference between "convenience" and "necessity" was discussed in Moon
Township Appeal, 387 Pa. 144, 127 A.2d 361 (1956), a case concerning tax exemptions
for concessions at a municipal airport:
That these commercial activities all served the convenience of the traveling
public is undisputed, but that is not enough to warrant a tax exemption; it must
be shown that they were neededfor the efficient operation ofthe Airport as a public
instrumentality and thereby partook of the character of its own public use.
ld. at 150-51, 127 A.2d at 364-65 (Emphasis added).
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characterized as "incidental."46
2. Future Use. As in most states, case law supports the acquisi-
tion of additional real property (beyond alignment and stations) for
reasonably anticipated future expansion of the system,47 both around
proposed stops and at points along the alignment where future stops
may be placed. However, such future acquisitions must be in accord-
46. See, e.g., Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957); Gate City Garage v.
City of Jacksonville, 66 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1953); Adams v. Hous. Auth., 60 So. 2d 663
(Fla. 1952).
In Monterey County Flood Control & Water Conserv. Dist. v. Hughes, 201 Cal.
App. 2d 197, 20 Cal. Rptr. 252 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962), the court, with a minimum of
statutory help, concluded that "excess" land could be taken for a flood control project
in order to provide recreational facilities:
In view of the fact that recreational uses are clearly related and incidental to
the maintenance and operation of a dam and reservoir for flood control and
water conservation purposes, and also recognizing the strong public interest in
such recreational uses as shown by legislative declarations and approval, we be-
lieve that under the act the power of eminent domain would include the taking of
property for such related and incidental uses.
Id. at 205, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 257 (Emphasis added). One of the broadest definitions of
public project, for which a variety of agencies are empowered (by reference) to con-
demn, is set out in the Kentucky statutes:
"Public project" means any lands, buildings, or structures, works or facilities
(a) suitable for and intended for use as public property for public purposes or
suitable for and intended for use in the promotion of the public health, public
welfare or the conservation of natural resources, including the planning of any
such lands, buildings, structures, works or facilities; or (b) suitable for and in-
tended for use for the purpose of creating or increasing the public recreational,
cultural and related business facilities of a community, including such structures
as concert halls, museums, stadiums, theaters and other public facilities, together
with related and appurtenant parking garages, offices and office buildings for
rental in whole or in part to private tenants, dwelling units and apartment build-
ings for rental in whole or in part to private tenants, commercial and retail busi-
nesses, stores or other establishments, and any structure or structures or
combination of the foregoing, or other structures having as their primary purpose
the creation, improvement, revitalization, renewal or modernization of a central
business or shopping community, and shall also include existing lands, buildings,
structures, works and facilities, as well as improvements or additions to any such
lands, buildings, structures, works or facilities.
Ky. REy. STAT. ANN. § 58.010(1) (Baldwin 1975).
47. See generally People v. Cramer, 14 Cal. App. 3d 513, 92 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Ct.
App. 1971); Boalsburg Water Co. v. State College Water Co., 240 Pa. 198, 87 A. 609
(1913); Vance, Advance Acquisition of Highway Rights-of- Way in 2 SELECTED STUD-
IES IN HIGHWAY LAW 903 (J. Vance ed. 1976); Callies & Duerksen, supra note 1, at
81-83, Callies & Siemon, supra note 20, at 22-23; Legal Element, supra note 20, at 17-
23.
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ance with a well-defined and comprehensive plan for the systems,48
reasonably related to expected future needs,49 and usable within the
reasonably foreseeable future.
50
In fact, on the theory that land values appreciate, some courts have
nearly implied a duty to acquire land in advance of need.5 There-
48. State v. 14.69 Acres of Land, 226 A.2d 828 (Del. 1967); City of Jacksonville v.
Griffin, 346 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1977); Pidstanski v. South Whitehall Township, 33 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 162, 380 A.2d 1322 (Commw. Ct. 1977).
The record demonstrates that the Township's actions, rather than being arbi-
trary, were carefully planned and painstakingly thought out with a view toward
present and future requirements. Acquisition of the land bordering the Jordan
Creek and lying between two historically important covered bridges was first dis-
cussed by Township officials in 1966, and that year initial studies ofthe area as a
park were made by the Township's Planning Commission. In 1968 the Park and
Recreation Board, after studying existing recreation facilities, recommended set-
ting aside a large plot of ground of considerable acreage for a community park.
The Jordan Creek site was a natural choice for such a park due to its size, low
acquisition cost, the historic character of the covered bridges, and the scenic
beauty of the Jordan Creek. The rear 1968 also marked the completion of the
Townshp 's comprehensive plan which contained a recommendation that the Town-
ship acquire several hundred acres as recreational land and speci/lcally endorsed
development of the proposed park site. Two years later, a survey of Township
residents demonstrated strong community backing of a multi-purpose commu-
nity park and recreation facility. Also in 1970, the Joint Planning Commission
for Lehigh and Northampton Counties stated that the proposed park was an im-
portant element in the long-range plan for development ofthe region. Finally, the
Township 'splans were thoroughly reviewed by both the Pennsylvania Department of
Community Affairs and the United States Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, pursuant to applications by the Township for grants-in-aid. Both the
state and the federal government approved the project and granted funding.
These facts and the entire record clearly demonstrate that the Township's deci-
sion to devote these 80 acres along the Jordan Creek to park and recreational
uses was based upon its informed perception of the Township's present and rea-
sonablyforeseeable future needs.
Id. at 167-68, 380 A.2d at 1324-25 (Emphasis added). See Port of Everett v. Everett
Improvement Co., 124 Wash. 486, 214 P. 1064 (1923).
49. Kellett v. Fulton County, 215 Ga. 551, 111 S.E.2d 364 (1959); Truitt v. Bor-
ough of Ambridge Water Auth., 389 Pa. 429, 133 A.2d 797 (1957).
50. While courts have struck down periods as long as 30 years, as in State v.
0.62033 Acres of Land, 49 Del. 90, 110 A.2d 1 (1954), and Grand Rapids Bd. of Educ.
v. Baczewski, 340 Mich. 265, 65 N.W.2d 810 (1954), periods of 15 or 20 years have
been held reasonable. Adams v. Greenwich Water Co., 138 Conn. 205, 83 A.2d 177
(1951); Carlor Co. v. City of Miami, 62 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1953). The period may, of
course, be limited specifically by statute, which does not necessarily affect the courts'
determination of reasonableness, but will usually be given considerable weight in so
deciding. See Vance, supra note 20, at 931.
51. Clemmer v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 207 Pa. Super. Ct. 388, 217
A.2d 800 (1966).
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fore, the city attorney advises Metropolis that it may indeed acquire a
mix of property rights around the alignment and stops, provided it
first notices, publishes, holds hearings upon, and adopts a plan setting
out expected future needs; sets out a tentative budget for develop-
ment of those sites; and projects such needs no further forward than
fifteen years.
The city attorney relies primarily on the state's school, highway,
and airport site acquisition law for this advice.52 He also advises Me-
tropolis that the sites thus acquired may be used in the interim not
only for other municipal purposes, but also for private-sector uses
such as parking, open air markets, and even "temporary" structures,
on the theory that Metropolis is obligated to make the best use of
municipal property under its control. Of course, the discussion above
pertaining to the use of municipal property for essentially private
uses would be applicable to any lease or other arrangements with the
private sector, but the fact that the use contemplated is temporary
would help make it permissible. The city attorney also advises the
city that, as with any municipal property, the city could dispose of the
property or hold it for other purposes if it should develop that the
52. Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700 (1923); City of Waukegan v.
Stanczak, 6 Ill. 2d 594, 129 N.E.2d 751 (1955); City of Chicago v. Vaccarro, 408 Ill.
587, 97 N.E.2d 766 (1951); Cochran v. Cavanaugh, 252 S.W. 284 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923).
The extent to which such "future acquisitions" are currently favored by the courts
is evident from Hayward Union High School Dist. v. Madrid, 234 Cal. App. 2d 100,
44 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1965), in which the court upheld an acquisition of property by a
school district for a school site even though it may never have been the intention of
the district to use the land for a new school, as represented, and even though the
district fully intended to sell it after a few years, provided the interim use was for
some school purpose-here, for storage and temporary buildings:
As to the allegation that the district knew that conditions would require the
sale of the property by the district after a few years-that fact could not consti-
tute a defense in the condemnation action. The fact that it was needed for school
purposes in the interim would permit the exercise of eminent domain.
It should be pointed out that even if the school district did not build new
school buildings as represented this would not constitute fraud. The district had
the right to condemn for any school purpose and on acquisition, to change to
some other school purpose any time during its ownership of the property. So
there could be no cause of action for fraud in this respect. If the district deter-
mines that the property is no longer desirable for school purposes and elects to
sell it to the city, it has the right to do so (see Newport v. City of Los Angeles,
infra, [1960] 184 Cal. App. 2d 229, 239, 7 Cal. Rptr. 497).
Id. at 121-22, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
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property is not needed.53 Although there is no supporting case law in
the state, the city attorney notes that other jurisdictions have so held,
in spite of claims by condemnees that they are entitled to recover the
property if the use for which it was acquired does not materialize.54
3. Remnant Acquisitions. Metropolis' tentative station and
alignment acquisition plans include only portions of a number of
parcels. To the extent that remainder interests of potential con-
demnees may be characterized as physical or economic remnants, the
city attorney advises Metropolis that it may acquire such parcels by
eminent domain." Indeed, if certain federal relocation legislation is
applicable, it may have to acquire such parcels.56 Since some poten-
tial remnants are located at the regional commercial and suburban
commercial stops, land not needed for stops may be leased or sold for
development.
The size of the remnants which the city may acquire under this
theory will depend largely upon the facts of the individual situations.
For example, one parcel consisting of eighteen acres is just barely
included in the stop near the airport in an industrial development
area. The alignment in that area is in the median of an expressway,
and the stop acquisition requires condemnation of a two-acre strip
along a frontage road. The city would like the whole parcel, and the
remainder interest is worth only a small part of the price the city will
have to pay for the two acres. The city attorney advises that at least
one other state permits such remnant acquisitions, despite the area
disparity between the parcels, on the ground that the larger parcel is
53. See. e.g., In re City of Rochester, 137 N.Y. 243, 33 N.E. 320 (1893); Luby v.
City of Dallas, 396 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
54. See LaSalle Natl Bank v. County Bd. of School Trustees, 23 Ill. App. 3d 575
(1974), aftd, 61 Ill. 2d 524, 337 N.E.2d 19 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976).
55. Highway Law has provided most of the case law on the subject. See, e.g.,
Luby v. City of Dallas, 396 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). See also Callies &
Duerksen, supra note 1, at 85-86; Callies & Siemon, supra note 20, at 23-24; Hollo-
way, Supplemental Condemnation: .A Discussion of the Princples of Excess and Substi-
tute Condemnation, in 2 SELECTED STUDIES IN HIGHWAY LAW 767-86 (J. Vance ed.
1976) [hereinafter cited as Holloway]; MAIN REPORT, supra note 27, at 42-47. Many
jurisdictions provide for such remnant acquisition by statute. See, e.g., HAW. REv.
STAT. § 46-6 (1968) (Each county shall have the following specific powers: To take
private property. .. and also to take such excess over that neededfor such public use or
public improvement in cases where small remnants would otherwise be /eft. Id. (Empha-
sis added)).
56. Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4638 (Supp. V
1976).
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in fact a "financial" remnant.57
4. Physical Protection. The three downtown stops vary in char-
acter, and the chief of police advises that in order to adequately pro-
tect the stops from vandalism and other assorted urban incursions on
both property and patrons, he would like to see a "ring" of extra
property acquired. He is particularly concerned about the at-grade
urban stop in a redevelopment district." The city attorney will ap-
prove such an acquisition, provided the rationale is spelled out in the
plan, primarily because of the vast powers the city redevelopment
agency has to condemn and develop land. He believes such an acqui-
sition is supported by the plethora of cases in other jurisdictions up-
holding acquisitions for the protection of reservoirs, dams,59 and
57. The Supreme Court of California construed and upheld CAL. STS. & HY.
CODE § 104.1 (West 1956), quoted in note 55 supra, in People v. The Superior Court
of Merced County, 66 Cal. 2d 206, 436 P.2d 342, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1968), and held
that a "remnant" as large as 54 acres could be condemned under the remnant theory
of excess condemnation when it could probably be condemned for a little more than
the cost of taking the one-half acre needed for highway purposes, and paying dam-
ages for the remainder, which would become land-locked. Id. at 212-13, 436 P.2d at
346, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
Although a parcel of 54 land locked acres is not a physical remnant, it is a
financial remnant: its value as a land locked parcel is such that severance dam-
ages might equal its value. Remnant takings have long been considered proper.
Id. at 212-13, 436 P.2d at 346, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
58. See, e.g., City of Boston v. Talbot, 206 Mass. 82, 91 N.E. 1014 (1910).
59. See, e.g., Staplin v. Canal Auth., 208 So. 2d 853 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968):
Culley v. Pearl River Indus. Comm'n, 234 Miss. 788, 108 So. 2d 390 (1959); Cuglar v.
Power Auth., 4 Misc. 2d 879, 163 N.Y.S.2d 902, afJ'dmem., 4 App. Div. 2d 801, 164
N.Y.S.2d 686, affIdmem., 3 N.Y.2d 1006, 147 N.E.2d 733, 170 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1957);
Mclnnis v. Brown County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 41 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931). The rule is perhaps best stated in Truitt v. Borough of Ambridge Water
Auth., 389 Pa. 429, 133 A.2d 797 (1957):
We must bear in mind that in acquiring land for the purpose of an impounding
reservoir for the storage of water for human consumption something more is
needed than the absolute control of the water basin up to the maximum flood
water stage. . . . Any supplier of water must keep a strict and vigilant watch not
only over the reservoir itself but also over the avenues of approach thereto from
the watershed for the purpose of reducing to a minimum the dangers that arise
from the intake of surface water coming down from the watershed. To this end a
careful supplier of water will acquire land necessary not only for the actual im-
pounding of the water but also for a protective area for the water thus im-
pounded. The provision of such a protective area will insure, so far as possible,
the purity of the water destined for human needs.
Id. at 433, 133 A.2d at 799.
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highways.6" However, he recommends that such "protective" acqui-
Some states have constitutional and statutory provisions for such protective zones
for highways, as the following examples from New Jersey and California illustrate:
The State, or any of its cities or counties, may acquire by gift, purchase or
condemnation, lands for establishing, laying out, widening, enlarging, extending,
and maintaining memorial grounds, streets, squares, parkways and reservations
in and about and along and leading to any or all of the same, providing land so
acquired shall be limited to parcels lying wholly or in part within a distance not
to exceed one hundred fifty feet from the closest boundary of such public works
or improvements; provided, that when parcels which lie only partially within said
limit of one hundred fifty feet only such portions may be acquired which do not
exceed two hundred feet from said closest boundary, and after the establishment,
laying out, and completion of such improvements, may convey any such real
estate thus acquired and not necessary for such improvements, with reservations
concerning the future use and occupation of such real estate so as to protect such
public works and improvements and their environs and to preserve the view,
appearance, light, air and usefulness of such public works.
The Legislature may, by statute, prescribe procedure.
CAL. Co s-. art. I, § 14 1/2 (adopted 1928, repealed 1974).
Any agency or political subdivision of the State or any agency of a political subdi-
vision thereof, which may be empowered to take or otherwise acquire private prop-
erty for any public highway, parkway, airport, place, improvement, or use. . . may
be authorized by law to take or otherwise acquire a fee simple absolute in, easements
upon, or the benefit of restrictions upon, abutting property to preserve and protect the
public highway, parkway [etc.].
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 6, n.3 (Emphasis added).
California's new eminent domain statute specifically authorizes "protective acquisi-
tions" generally:
(a) Subject to any other statute relating to the acquisition of property, any
person authorized to acquire property for a particular use by eminent domain
may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property necessary to carry
out and make effective the principal purpose involved including but not limited
to property to be used for the protection or preservation of the attractiveness,
safety, and usefulness of the project.
(b) Subject to any applicable procedures governing the disposition of prop-
erty, a person may acquire property under subdivision (a) with the intent to sell,
lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of the property, or an interest therein, sub-
ject to such reservations or restrictions as are necessary to protect or preserve the
attractiveness, safety, and usefulness of the project.
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1240.120 (Deering Supp. 1978).
According to the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office, public agencies are now in a
more favorable position regarding protective acquisitions than they were prior to the
repeal of Article 1, § 14/ of the California Constitution in 1974. The new Eminent
Domain Law apparently does not contain any distance limitations for protective ac-
quisitions, and seems to be only a codification of existing California case law which
permits "taking incidental property to carry out and make effective the principal uses
involved." See City of Santa Barbara v. Cloer, 216 Cal. App. 2d 127, 30 Cal. Rptr.
743 (1963).
60. The provisions in N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 6, and CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14 /,
both apply to highways. See note 59 supra. In addition, there are cases which also
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sitions, as well as the so-called "economic viability" and "future use"
acquisitions, be specifically addressed in the new transit code amend-
ments previously discussed.
5. Economic Viability Acquisitions and Public Purpose. Metropo-
lis would like to help guarantee the success of its considerable invest-
ment in the system. It hopes to do this by assuring that development
which will utilize the fixed guideway system takes place in the closest
possible proximity to proposed transit stops, and also by participating
in the potentially lucrative development situation.6 Although Me-
tropolis is relatively free to offer various land use "bonuses" to attract
development into the narrow transit corridor,6 2 the city attorney has
already advised that it must take great care in exercising its local zon-
ing powers to coerce development, lest it fall afoul of traditional no-
tions concerning the scope of the police power and its effect on
property rights. Of course, the city attorney has also advised that
approve such acquisitions. See Barrett v. State Highway Dep't, 211 Ga. 876, 89
S.E.2d 652 (1955); White v. Johnson, 148 S.C. 488, 146 S.E. 411 (1929).
61. The question of supplemental or excess condemnation was of considerable
interest to scholars and commentators in the 1930's, many of whom favored expan-
sion of the doctrine. See Bender, Excess Condemnation in Wisconsin, 13 MARQ. L.
REV. 69 (1929); Hart, Excess Condemnation as a Solution of Some Problems of Urban
Ltf, II MARQ. L. REV. 222 (1927); Steiner, Excess Condemnation, 3 Mo. L. REV. I
(1938); Note, The Constitutionality of Excess Condemnation, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 108
(1946). Basically, this policy favors the acquisition of real property by eminent do-
main for the purpose of generating income to offset expected losses from the enter-
prise to which a principal and adjacent condemnation relates. Usually, there is
contemplated some private development on the parcel involved which is related to or
serves the principal project. For a concise but thorough treatment of this subject, see
Holloway, supra note 55. See also Callies & Duerksen, supra note I, at 77, Callies &
Siemon, supra note 20, at 19, Legal Element, supra note 20, at 1-32, MAIN REPORT,
supra note 27, at 55-66.
As at least one commentator has noted, the tendency in some jurisdictions has
clearly permitted more of such acquisitions, provided there is some relation of the
commercial venture to the public work which forms the basis for the principal emi-
nent domain acquisition. Much of this law relates to highways rather than fixed
guideway rapid transit systems. Holloway, supra note 55, at 770-71, 776. Others have
noted an increase in courts' willingness to uphold such acquisitions for eventual rede-
velopment by private interests. See Barton-Aschman Associates, Multiple Use of
Lands Within Highway Rights-of- Way, in NATIONAL COOPERATIVE HIGHWAY RE-
SEARCH PROGRAM REPORT No. 53 54 (1968).
62. A number of jurisdictions use this technique, among the most well-known of
which is New York. See URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF PLANNED
UNIT DEVELOPMENT (1965) (Tech. Bull. No. 52).
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such transit corridor zoning 63 will be judicially palatable if it is in
accordance with a comprehensive and well-documented land use
plan for the city.64 Indeed, one state has such an ordinance drafted
for its largest city,65 and several others already contemplate some-
thing similar.66
The city attorney advises that economic viability doctrines have
been upheld in several port authority cases where extra land was con-
demned to lease back to private container, shipping, and other inter-
ests, 67 and in cases where the commercial ventures actually served the
63. Transit corridor zoning has been most successfully used in Toronto, where a
metrogov of sorts controls a vastly larger land area and where there is virtually no
theory under which a restricted owner can claim a constitutionally protected, and
hence compensable, taking for undue property restrictions. HOLMES, supra note 21, at
105-27.
64. The requirements for such a plan have long been recognized. See Mandelker,
The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REV.
899 (1976).
65. HONOLULU, HAWAII, BILL 78 (1977) is the draft of a transit corridor zoning
ordinance. It has not yet been passed, however, because the counsel to the City Coun-
cil publicly expressed concern about certain discretionary approval powers it purports
to grant without definitive standards. Interview with Wilfred Mita, Deputy Director
of Council Services, City & County of Honolulu in Honolulu, Haw. (November
1977).
66. E.g., Miami and Atlanta. Interview with Woodrow Moore, Chief Planner,
Miami-Dade County Dep't. of Transp., Rapid Transit Division, in Miami, Fla. (June
1978); interviews with William Christian, Atlanta Regional Comm'n, and Larry
Thompson and Jay Levine, Counsel to MARTA, in Atlanta, Ga. (June 1978).
67. Sublett v. City of Tulsa, 405 P.2d 185 (Okla. 1965); Port of Umatilla v. Rich-
mond, 212 Or. 596, 321 P.2d 338 (1958); Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation Dist.,
271 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1954).
As in Texas, authorities responsible for the creation and development of ports are
given broad power to condemn in Kentucky. A riverport authority may by condem-
nation acquire facilities, but may also "acquire and develop, property, or rights
therein, within the economic environs of the riverport or proposed riverport to attract
directly or indirectly river oriented industry." Ky. REV. STAT. § 65.530(1) (1970). In
fact, it may
acquire by contract, lease, purchase, option, gift, condemnation or otherwise any
real or personal property or rights therein, necessary or suitable for establishing,
developing operating or expanding riverports, riverport facilities, water navigation
facilities, including spoilage areas for the disposal of materials dredgedfrom river
bottoms in an effort to improve the navigability of rivers, and industrial parks or
sites within the economic environs of the riverport orproposed riverport. The au-
thority may erect, equip, operate and maintain on such property buildings and
equipment necessary and proper for riverport and water navigation facilities.
The authority may dispose of any real or personal property, or rights therein,
which in the opinion of the authority is not needed for use as riverport or water
navigation facilities, or use as industrial parks or sites. The authority may lease,
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travelling public, such as gas stations and restaurants along high-
ways.6" However, only one jurisdiction has upheld such takings for
the sole purpose of guaranteeing the economic viability of a publicly-
funded project outside of a redevelopment area.69 Furthermore, most
such cases have turned upon the presence of specific constitutional or
statutory language declaring that such acquisition is in the public in-
terest and for a public purpose,7" and the case law interpreting such
language and the general climate in the jurisdiction with respect to
the breadth of public purpose.7
sell, convey, or assign its interest in land owned, optioned, or otherwise held by it to
anypersonfor thepurpose of constructing and/or operating any industrial or corn-
mercialfacdit;, orfor the purpose of acting as the authorit,'s agent or licensee in
effectively carrying out any of its powers and duties.
Id. at § 65.530(4) (Emphasis added).
Acting under this broad grant of authority, the Louisville and Jefferson County
Riverport Authority, after extensive investigation, is on the verge of developing an
industrial park of approximately 1,750 acres, located southwest of the central business
district on the east bank of the Ohio River. In the past few years the Authority has
put together approximately 52 parcels of land, although using eminent domain to
acquire only one of them.
In order to proceed with development, the Authority is seeking the rezoning of
approximately 1,600 acres of the property to accommodate and permit the construc-
tion of river-oriented industry, public and private port facilities, ancillary industrial
parks, and a management center for the Authority itself. The property has been
"floodproofed." Presently, the property is zoned residential and has been leased back
to the original owners to continue the present uses. The Authority contemplates a
writ of lease and sale of this huge "bank" of industrial property to private interests.
Permitted uses are covered in an extensive Master Plan. Conference with Col. Robert
H. Allan, Executive Director and General Manager, Louisville and Jefferson County
Riverport Authority (Sept. 16, 1975). [1974] LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY
RIVERPORT AUTHORITY ANN. REP. SWINDELL-DRESSLER COMPANY, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL ASSESSMENT OF THE RIVERPORT INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROPOSAL BY THE
RIVERPORT AUTHORITY, (1975); Yater, Riverport: New Kingdornfor the Southwest,
LOUISVILLE, July 1974, at 39.
68. E.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 330 Mass. 713, 113 N.E.2d 452 (1953).
69. Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Auth. 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190
N.E.2d 402,240 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963); Bush Terminal Co. v. City of New York, 282 N.Y.
306, 26 N.E.2d 269, 16 N.Y.S.2d (1940). California, relying on a number of such
cases, upheld a condemnation in Hollywood for the purpose of leasing to the private
sector an entertainment center. County of Los Angeles v. Authority, 224 Cal. App. 2d
102, 36 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1964).
70. New York courts approved such language in Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v.
Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963). See
OHIO CONST. art. 18, § 10, as set out in City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242, 243
n.l (6th Cir. 1929), rev'don other grounds, 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
71. See, e.g., Petty v. Hospital Auth. of Douglas County, 233 Ga. 109, 210 S.E.2d
317 (1974); Tift v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 161 Ga. 432, 131 S.E. 46 (1925) (upholding
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According to the city attorney's research, the local judiciary has
generally sustained any legislative declaration of public purpose with
respect to eminent domain authorizations, but has never ruled on an
"economic viability" taking. However, the courts once looked to the
case law upholding redevelopment takings in connection with a "fu-
ture use" taking. Therefore, the city attorney advises the city that if
suitable amendatory language is inserted in the new transit code, a
substantial argument in favor of such economic viability takings can
be made by referring to the redevelopment cases. He suggests, how-
ever, that the case would be strengthened by amending the city char-
ter or state constitution to provide language similar to that found in
the Ohio Constitution7" and the New York statutes73 with respect to
economic ventures. He cautions that, regardless of the language ad-
ded, it is unlikely the courts will permit the city to condemn parcels
for the sole purpose of resale in order to defray the costs of the sys-
tem. 74
D. Monetary Transfers
The city would like to levy an assessment on the owners of com-
mercial centers adjacent to proposed transit stations on the theory
that the improved public accessibility is a benefit conferred specially
upon these property owners. 5 The rationale is identical to the one
condemnation for warehouses and depots for the accommodation of businesses); Lou-
isville and Nashville Ry. v. Maxey, 139 Ga. 541, 77 S.E. 801 (1912).
72. OHIO CONST. art. 18, § 10.
73. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 6601-6618 (65 McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
74. City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1929) rer'd on other
grounds, 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
75. See, e.g., Callies & Duerksen, supra note 1, at 86-89; Callies & Siemon, supra
note 20, at 40; Hayes, Rapid Transit Financing: Use of the Special Assessment, 29
STAN. L. REV. 795 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hayes]; Legal Element, supra note 20,
at 34-40.
The use of special assessment districts to finance rapid transit systems would pro-
vide needed funds in an equitable manner. The financing technique can gener-
ate a significant amount of capital and, because the rapid transit assessment can
be modeled on traditional special assessment statutes, it is a legally dependable
financing mechanism. Nonconstitutional legal challenges to the rapid transit as-
sessment procedure are likely to fail as they do under traditional assessment stat-
utes, and equal protection voting challenges, though more problematic, also are
surmountable.
.d. at 817-18.
For a less sanguine view, see R. SHAWCROFT, E. NORWOOD & M. LESTER, POTEN-
TIAL FOR BET-ERMENT DISTRICT FINANCING AND JOINT DEVELOPMENT APPLICA-
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which underlies abutting property assessments for street widenings,
sidewalks, and water/sewer lines,7 6 and similar to that for assessing
commercial owners for all or a portion of the cost of turning their
block into a pedestrian mall, for which there are specific procedures
in some state statutes.77
TIONS TO SURFACE TRANSIT. (July 1977) (Research Rep. No. 77-7 Urban Transp.
Program, Dep'ts Civ. Eng. & Urban Planning, Univ. Of Wash., Seattle).
Moreover, it is worth noting that not every commercial property owner is always
pleased to see the development of a fixed guideway rapid transit system nearby. Al-
leging a variety of inconveniences and damages caused by the construction of
MARTA, the "unique entertainment complex" known as Underground Atlanta has
sued MARTA through the Underground Atlanta Merchants Association on a theory
of inverse condemnation, based primarily on the alleged difficulty of access to the
area because of MARTA's construction. A separate and similar action has been filed
by the corporation that owns and operates two separate establishments in Under-
ground Atlanta. See Underground Atlanta Merchants Ass'n v. Metropolitan Atlanta
Rapid Transit Auth., No. C-37912, (Super. Ct. of Fulton County, Ga. 1978); Down-
side Risk, Inc. v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., No. C-2863, (Super. Ct.
of Fulton County, Ga. 1978). Both allege impairment of light and air and other dam-
age as well, as the following excerpts from the Downside Risk complaint demonstrate:
Furthermore, in the process of constructing the aforementioned rapid transit
station, MARTA has obstructed and closed Old Pryor Street at a point slightly
east of its intersection with Old Alabama Street, and has thereby wholly negated
and impaired the use of said street by persons desiring to enter Underground
Atlanta via Old Pryor Street from an easterly direction. As a result of the closing
of Old Pryor Street, plaintiff has been deprived of a major artery of access to its
premises and the valuable stream of commerce provided by said artery ...
That due to the negligent and improper manner in which said improvements
have been and continue to be constructed, defendant MARTA has created a
blemish and eyesore directly in front of plaintiffs commercial establishment as to
amount to a present and continuing nuisance. . . . That as a direct result of the
aforementioned activities of the defendant MARTA, the easement of light, air
and scenic view to plaintiffs leasehold estate has been wholly negated, to the
great and substantial detriment of said property, without the prior payment of
just compensation therefor in violation of Art. I, § 3, Par. I of the Constitution of
the State of Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 2-301, as amended).
Complaint, Downside Risk, Inc. v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., No. C-
2863, (Super. Ct. of Fulton County, Ga. 1978). It may be that various value capture
techniques would be useful in offsetting such claims.
76. See, e.g., Shell Isle Homes, Inc. v. City of St. Petersberg, 199 So. 2d 525 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967); City of Gainesville v. McCreary, 66 Fla. 504, 63 So. 914 (1913):
29A FLA. JUR., Special Assessments § 9.
77. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 93A.010-.030 (Baldwin 1977).
The general assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky finds as a fact that
the preservation of downtown areas of cities is vital to the health, safety and
material well-being of the citizens and inhabitants thereof, and that the construc-
tion and installation of pedestrian mall projects will contribute to the safe and
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As the city attorney points out, while the theory may be sound, at
effective movement of persons, and serve the public health, safety, convenience,
enjoyment and general welfare. The governing body of a city, to protect and
serve the public safety, convenience and welfare and the interests of the public in
the safe and effective movement of persons, and to preserve and enhance the
function, appearance and economic viability of the central mercantile and busi-
ness areas of such city, may initiate, construct, install and establish a pedestrian
mall project in the manner herein provided, at the exclusive cost of the owners of
land located in the pedestrian mall benefit area, which is benefited by a pedes-
trian mall project ...
(12) "Pedestrian mall benefit area" means and shall include all of the land
(except such as is located in a public way) which the governing body of the city
by ordinance determines will be benefited by a pedestrian mall project, including
specifically all land abutting directly on both sides of such project, and said pe-
destrian mall benefit area, may, if such benefit be so determined, include all of
the land in each square block one side of which abuts or fronts upon a pedestrian
mall; provided that lands not directly abutting a project shall be assessed at a
lesser ratio, as provided in KRS 93A.030 ....
(1) The general assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky determines as a
legislative finding of fact that the initiation, construction, installation and estab-
lishment of a pedestrian mall project pursuant to the authority contained in this
chapter constitutes a direct, physical, material and substantial benefit to land
fronting and abutting directly upon said pedestrian mall project; and may, di-
rectp. p/h'sicallyv materia4ly and substantially benet the land other than that land
directlr fronting and abutting upon the pedestrian mall project which is situated
within ever;, square block, a portion of which directly abuts a pedestrian mall pro-
ject, if said benefit is so established and determined by the governing body of a
city instituting such project. However, that land situated within such square
blocks not directly fronting and abutting upon a pedestrian mall project, where
benefited, is recognized to be directly, physically, materially and substantially
benefited to a lesser degree than land directly fronting and abutting upon such
pedestrian mall project.
(2) The governing body of a city instituting, installing, constructing and es-
tablishing a pedestrian mall project shall, based upon a careful study of the facts
involved, determine the nature and scope of the area of land benefited by the
pedestrian mall project. The governing body may, if benefit be determined to
inure to land other than that fronting and abutting directly upon a pedestrian
mall project, ordain and determine that such land other than land directly front-
ing and abutting upon the project is benefited by such project; provided, how-
ever, that in such event the benefited land other than that directly fronting and
abutting upon the pedestrian mall project shall not be assessed to an extent
greater than as hereinafter set forth.
(3) In the event the governing body shall determine that land directly front-
ing and abutting on a pedestrian mall project is the only land benefited by said
project, such land shall be the only property included in the pedestrian mall ben-
efit area, and shall be assessed the entire costs of the project, on the assessed
value basis authorized by KRS Chapter 107, as hereinafter provided. In the event
the go verning body shall determine that the pedestrian mall project will benlt all
properties situated within ever, square block abutting upon a pedestrian mall pro-
ject, the pedestrian mall beneft area shall be divided into two special beneit assess-
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the very least a charter amendment, if not a state statute, would have
to be passed specifically authorizing such a "special benefits" assess-
ment.78 Moreover, questions of valuation and assessment could get
quite complicated.79 However, the city attorney is satisfied that as
long as the amounts assessed are reasonable, the state courts will not
question the amount of special benefit deemed conferred on local
property owners by the location of a nearby transit stop.80 He recom-
ment zones, to be identied as zone one benefited land and zone two benefited land
Zone one benefted land shall include all landfronting and abutting on the pedes-
trian mall project to the depth of each parcel ofland which fronts on said pedestrian
mall project;provided, however, that zone one benefited land shall be assessed only
to a depth from the pedestrian mall project of 210feet, it being determined as a
legislativefinding offact that direct, physical, material, and substantial benefits of
the nature resulting from abutting directly upon such project do not accrue to
properties which are situated at a distancefrom the pedestrian mall project exceed-
ing 210feet. All of the remaining land situated within any square block fronting
upon a pedestrian mall project shall be classfied as zone two benefited land.
(4) In levying improvement benefit assessments against all benefited lands
situated within the geographical boundaries of the pedestrian mall benefit area,
as such area is defined by ordinance adopted by the governing body, in the event
the governing body has determined that all property situated within every square
block abutting upon a pedestrian mall project shall be benefited by the project,
and that all such property shall consequently be classified as zone one benefited
land and zone two benefited land, not less than eighty percent of the total
amount of improvement benefit assessments levied in each year shall be levied
against and collected from the owners of the land classified as zone one benefited
land, and the remainder of the total amount of improvement benefit assessments
levied in each year shall be levied against and collected from the owners of the
land classified as zone two benefited land. All such assessments to be made on
the assessed value basis.
Id. at § 93A.010(12), .020, .030 (Emphasis added). See also HAw. REv. STAT. § 46-78
(1968); HONOLULU, HAWAII, REv. ORD. § 24-3.1 (1969). Non-abutting assessments
for parking were specifically upheld in Schnack v. City and County of Honolulu, 41
Haw. 219 (1955).
78. See Roberts v. Evanston, 218 Ill. 296, 75 N.E. 923 (1905); Goodrich v. City of
Detroit, 123 Mich. 559, 82 N.W. 255 (1900). But see Johnson v. City of Inkster, 56
Mich. App. 581, 224 N.W.2d 664 (1974), rev'd, 401 Mich. 263, 258 N.W.2d 24 (1977),
in which the Charter of the City of Inkster so provided, and a non-abutting assess-
ment extending 1,500 feet to either side of a road was first approved and then struck
down on appeal. For discussion of issues, see Batchelder, supra note 20, at 12-19.
79. For courts troubled about computation of benefits, see Fisher v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 84 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1956); Crowder v. Phillips, 146 Fla. 428, 1 So. 2d 629
(1941). This matter was of sufficient concern to BART officials in San Francisco that
the special benefits assessment statute, note 81 infra, was never used. Some courts are
not, however, so troubled by the matter of valuation. See, e.g., Paterson v. City of
Bismarck, 212 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 1973).
80. See City of Hallandale v. Meeking, 237 So. 2d 318 (Fla. App. 1970); Ocean
Beach Hotel Co. v. Town of Atlantic Beach, 147 Fla. 445, 2 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1941);
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mends drawing concentric rings around the stop or stops in question
and establishing separate declining rates of assessment for each dis-
trict radiating out from the station, much as is provided in the State
of California for transit stations.8'
The city is also interested in utilizing a tax allocation scheme so
Brock v. Lemke, 51 Haw. 175, 455 P.2d 1 (1969): Schnack v. City and County of
Honolulu, 41 Haw. 219 (1955): Taylor v. City and County of Honolulu, 25 Haw. 58
(1919), McCandless v. City and County of Honolulu, 24 Haw. 524 (1918).
81. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 99001 (West 1973):
The legislative body of any city or the board of supervisors of any city and
county may establish one or more special benefit districts within the city and
county pursuant to this chapter.
Any special benefit district may contain separate zones, which may consist of
either contiguous or noncontiguous areas of land within the city or city and
county. Each zone within a special benefit district shall be an area adjacent to a
station of the municipal transportation system or along the route or lines of such
system which the legislative body or board of supervisors determines will receive
special benefit by reason of the operation of transportation facilities but all zones
within a special benefit district need not be adjacent to the same station or adja-
cent to the same portion of the route or lines.
Id.
The California special benefit district legislation performs several important func-
tions. First, it represents a declaration by the legislature that special benefits may
accrue to property along a mass transit line. Although a property owner may claim
that his land receives no special benefit, the courts give great weight to this legislative
determination. Thus, once the powers herein are granted to the local transit district
and that district lays out the special benefit districts, the burden to show that certain
land is not specially benefited is placed upon the landowner.
Second, the legislation specifically allows for the creation of several special benefit
districts within one transit district (around each transit station). Moreover, each spe-
cial benefit district itself may contain separate zones. These provisions give the transit
district considerable flexibility in apportioning costs in direct proportion to benefits.
Instead of assessing only property adjacent to the transit station (as in the typical
street assessment), the district may set up zones with assessments decreasing in pro-
portion to the distance from the transit stop.
This piece of legislation has never been used. Much of BART's acquisition pro-
gram was completed by the time the so-called Mills Bill became law. Moreover, on
advice of counsel, BART officials were apparently particularly concerned with the
effect of protracted hearings and litigation over such new financing upon its pro-
grams. Finally, the method of establishing the criteria for ascertaining incremental
value was thought to be too difficult, often resulting in arbitrary decisions. It was also
thought that sufficient benefit would accrue to BART through its district taxing mech-
anism values in Main County caused by the development of BART.
Moreover, according to the sponsor of the original legislation, Senator James Mills,
the use of special benefit assessments in the future is extremely unlikely. First, most
extensions would go in the taxing district from which money to finance BART has
already been collected. Property owners there are not likely to vote themselves addi-
tional taxes. Second, for similar reasons, those presently benefiting by proximity to
the line are without incentive altogether to vote themselves additional taxes. While it
1979]
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that it is guaranteed a certain percentage of the county ad valorem
real property tax revenue increases attributable to the fixed guideway
stations. The system, which is used in connection with redevelop-
ment districts, is called tax increment financing. It is used extensively
throughout California and is becoming increasingly popular around
the country. 82 The city is particularly interested in the scheme as an
alternative to other value capture techniques in the downtown area,
certain core areas, and as perhaps the only acceptable technique in
nearby suburban areas. Some of the other value capture techniques
may appear socialistic or appear to lay the groundwork for tax in-
creases, both an anathema to the suburban residents.
The city attorney advises Metropolis of a need for state enabling
legislation specifically authorizing tax increment financing. Based
would be possible to use special benefit assessment for a new system, such as in Los
Angeles, Mills is not aware of any entity in California interested in using it.
See also IND. CODE § 19-5, ch. 7.6 (1976), which is substantially similar for transit
purposes; Hagman, supra note 20, at 362, n.76.
82. Basically, tax increment financing is a method by which one municipal
agency, usually a general purpose government, pledges all or a portion of the incre-
mental tax revenue resulting from a public improvement or development paid for by
a second agency, to that agency in order to pay it back. The pledge is generally the
quidpro quo demanded by the second agency before it will undertake the develop-
ment and is a device for financing the project. It is a reallocation of the value added
among governmental units permitting a portion of increment to be segregated for spe-
cific purposes rather than placed in a general fund. Callies & Siemon, supra note 20,
at 40-41.
The future of tax increment financing may be clouded in California by Proposition
13, which passed on June 6, 1978. This initiative, the result of substantial taxpayer
disaffection with tax increases accompanying real property value increases, substan-
tially affects the marketability of tax allocation bonds. Moody's, the well-known bond
rating service, had already suspended ratings on all $1.6 billion existing California tax
allocation bonds pending the outcome of the referendum. Wong, Householders Re-
volt: Referendum for Slashing Property Tax Alarms California Establishment; Close
Vote Foreseen, Wall St. J., May 10, 1978, at 46.
A number of states are considering tax increment financing. See. e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 163.387 (West 1978); RALPH ANDERSON AND ASSOCIATES, REDEVELOPMENT
AND TAX INCREMENT FINANCING BY CITIES AND COUNTIES IN CALIFORNIA (1976);
Batchelder, supra note 20, at 19-22; Atlanta Regional Council Staff, Selected Value
Capture Opportunities Related to the Rapid Transit System in Metropolitan Atlanta
12 (Working Paper draft of January 1978). Moreover, the State Supreme Courts in
both Iowa (Richards v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48 (Ia. 1975)) and Utah (Tribe
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (1975)) have had occasion to pass on their states'
tax increment financing laws in the context of urban development schemes. Both
approved. However, the Supreme Court of Kentucky struck down that state's tax
increment financing statute in Miller v. Covington Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d I (Ky.
1976) (regarding a problem with school financing alleged to be unique to Kentucky).
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upon his examination of statutes in other jurisdictions,83 he recom-
mends that the city sponsor a statute that would set out the manner of
creating a tax increment financing district,84 and establish the specific
amount of ad valorem real property tax revenues from the district
area which a general purpose government may pledge or commit to
the project.85 Because other jurisdictions tend to underestimate the
added drain on services that such projects cause the general purpose
government, the city attorney recommends this limit be set at eighty
per cent of the increment over a base year. Finally, the statute would
make clear that the fund set up to receive the tax increment payments
is the sole source for retiring any bonds issued by the district or spe-
cial purchasing agency. 6 The city attorney notes, however, that this
may result in a substantial discounting of the bonds, as the increment
level may be perceived by investors as speculative.
E. Intergovernmental Relations
A portion of the proposed rapid transit system will be located
outside the city's boundaries. Absent special legislation, Metropolis'
transportation department will have no jurisdiction over that portion
absent interlocal or intergovernmental agreements with the other af-
fected general purpose governments.87 As noted above, the state con-
83. CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 16; Ga. HR No. 162-686, to amend GA. CONST. art. IX,
§ IV.
84. Eg., UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-19-25 (Supp. 1974).
85. Eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.387 (West 1978)
The annual funding of the redevelopment trust fund shall be in an amount not
less than that increment in the income, proceeds, revenues and funds of the
county or municipality derived from or held in connection with its undertaking
and carrying out of community redevelopment projects under this part. Such
increment shall be determined annually and should be that amount equal to the
difference between:
(a) that amount of ad valoren taxes levied each year by all taxing authorities
except school districts on taxable real property contained within the geographic
boundaries of a community redevelopment project; and
(b) that amount of ad valorem taxes which would have been produced by the
rate upon which the tax is levied each year by or for all taxing authorities except
school districts upon the total of the assessed value of the taxable property in the
community redevelopment project as shown upon the assessment role used in
connection with the taxation of such property by each taxing authority, last
equalized prior to the effective date of the ordinance approving the community
redevelopment plan.
Id.
86. Eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.387 (West 1978).
87. A number of jurisdictions have proceeded with interlocal agreements in a va-
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stitution allows such agreements, specifically permitting any local
government to exercise any of its powers on behalf of another in ac-
cordance with a duly approved local government agreement.88
The city attorney recommends a series of joint powers agreements
to coordinate development at all stops along the system, together with
a sharing of the costs on a pro rata basis. Any party to such agree-
ments would have the right to take enforcement action.
In addition, the city attorney recommends another set of agree-
ments with special purpose agencies such as school districts, park dis-
tricts, and urban renewal districts, which would provide a
coordinated use of eminent domain powers to strengthen any weak
"public purpose" exercise of such powers. The city attorney recom-
mends that a joint powers agreement be executed, specifically giving
the city the right to exercise the power of eminent domain on behalf
of all signatories to streamline the acquisition of land around transit
riety of forms to undertake joint projects, especially in highway rights of way. RIVKIN
& ASSOCIATES, INC., ACQUISITIONS OF LAND FOR JOINT HIGHWAYS & COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT CASE STUDIES (1976) (U.S. Dep't. of Transp. DOT-FH-U-8848, NTIS
PB 273 399). Many others are in the planning or early construction steps with respect
to fixed guideway rapid transit systems. See, e.g., Joint Development Applications.
supra note 20. Some states provide by statute for interlocal cooperation for transit
systems.
(I) In addition to all other powers and rights granted by KRS Chapter 96A,
public bodies are expressly authorized and empowered to enter into joint agree-
ments and multi-municipal compacts with transit authorities, and all other units
of government, both federal and state, for the acquisition, maintenance and oper-
ation of mass transportation facilities. Any such agreements may provide for
proportionate payments by such public bodies for transit purposes based upon
any reasonable criteria, including, but not by way of limitation, population and
actual mass transit services rendered.
(2) Any such joint agreement or multi-municipal compact may provide by its
terms that notwithstanding the fact that a mass transportation program, together
with the source of funding therefor, has been approved by the electorate or elec-
torates of one or more of such public bodies, any such public body may, in any
annual period, in lieu of utilizing such source of funding as approved by the
electorate of any such public body, use and apply for purposes of making pay-
ments or contributions under such joint agreement or multi-municipal compact
any other funds of such public body legally available therefor. Provided, how-
ever, that any source of funding approved by the electorate in connection with
the approval of such a mass transportation program shall not, as a result of such
permissive funding by any such public body from other legally available sources,
be rendered void or negatory.
KY. REV. STAT. § 96A 370 (1976).
88. See, e.g., joint powers agreements executed on behalf of various governmental
entities in the BART service region, pursuant to California statutes. See also PA.
CONST. art. 9, § 5.
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stops. Thus, for example, the city could condemn land for a school if
the school district were a party, or for a park if the park district were
a party, and utilize the land in the interim for value capture purposes.
CONCLUSION
And so our story ends-or at least the financing chapter of it. The
city and its governmental partners will likely opt to utilize a variety
of the various financing techniques, depending upon the factual cir-
cumstances surrounding each proposed stop:
(a) Is it a primarily developed or primarily undeveloped area?
(b) Is the city attempting to attract development or guide and
shape the expansion of what is already there?
(c) How strong are the economic forces attracting or repelling
development?
(d) To what extent would protracted litigation unreasonably
delay development of the transit system?
It is a judicious mix of the techniques that will best serve the interests
of both private and public sectors in developing a joint develop-
ment/value capture policy.
There is, of course, a plethora of further concerns which a city and
its counsel must address in the course of developing a rapid transit
system. Additional sources of funding may be available from the
federal government, with varying criteria for each source. An analy-
sis of UMTA legislation alone discloses several sources, each with
different requirements. In addition, funds are available elsewhere in
the Department of Transportation and from other federal depart-
ments and their respective agencies, as well. The city will carefully
consider the form of the lead government agency, especially in its
developer's role. The perspective above is primarily from that of
joint development/value capture financing. UMTA has begun to in-
vestigate the use of Transit Corridor Development Corporations
(TCDC's). 9 With a grant from UMTA, Portland, Oregon, is cur-
89. Much of the language in the so-called "Young Amendment", Urban Mass
Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. § 1602(a)(l)(A)(1975), which specifically au-
thorized TCDC's was deleted in the major overhauling of UMTA's governing statute
that is the new Surface Transportation Act of 1978. However, joint development per
se was much strengthened. See id. at § 302(A)(1)(D):
[T]ransportation projects which enhance the effectiveness of any mass trans-
portation project and are physically or functionally related to such mass trans-
portation project or which create new or enhanced coordination between public
transportation and other forms of transportation, either of which enhance urban
economic development or incorporate private investment including commercial
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rently investigating how such a corporation might be utilized to de-
velop a whole transportation system.
Each of these issues-and the list is by no means either compre-
hensive or definitive-requires careful examination during the course
of developing a rapid transit system. With the growth of existing sys-
tems and the planning and construction -of new ones in the past ten
years it should be comparatively no time at all until practical answers
are at hand.
and residential development. The term "eligible costs" includes property acquisi-
tion, demolition of existing structures, site preparation, utilities, building founda-
tions, walkways, open space, and the acquisition, construction, and improvement
of facilities and equipment for intermodal transfer facilities and transit malls, but
does not include the construction of commercial revenue-producing facilities,
whether publicly or privately owned, or of those portions of public facilities not
related to mass transportation. The Secretary shall require that all grants and
loans under this paragraph be subject to such terms, conditions, requirements,
and provisions as the Secretary determines necessary or appropriate for purposes
of this section, including requirements for the disposition of net increases in
value of real property resulting from the project assisted under this section. The
Secretary shall require in all grants and loans under this subparagraph that any
person or entity that contracts to occupy space in facilities funded under this
subparagraph shall pay a fair share of the costs of such facilities, through rental
payments and other means.
[Vol 16 155
